Dear Partners and Friends,
Kuroto Fund, LP declined -6.6% in the third quarter of 2022 and was down -21.1% for the year to date through September 30th, 2022. By comparison, the MSCI EM index declined -11.6% in the quarter and -27.2% for the year to date.
In Kuroto Fund's first quarter 2022 letter, we discussed the impact that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would likely have on our Georgian investments, which represent 21.5% of the fund as of the end of Q3 2022. Immediately following the invasion, our investments in Georgia sold off by more than 30%. Markets were concerned that Georgia—which lost 20% of its territory to Russia in 2008—might be subject to another Russian invasion. And, even if Russia didn’t invade Georgia, it seemed inevitable that Georgia’s GDP would be hit, with regional trade flows slowing, Russian tourism stopping, and remittances from Georgians living in Russia declining. In fact, the exact opposite has occurred. Russia’s struggles in Ukraine make it unlikely that Russia will invade Georgia, or any other former Soviet republic for that matter. Moreover, Georgia is experiencing what can fairly be described as an economic boom.
Georgia’s real GDP growth is expected to exceed 10% this year—the second straight year of 10%+ growth in real terms. This growth is being driven by three factors: 1) regional trade and manufacturing rerouting to Georgia because of sanctions on Russia; 2) an influx of Russian work-from-home tech employees to Georgia; 3) a large increase in remittances from Georgians living in Russia.
The first factor—a regional trade and manufacturing shift to Georgia—can best be understood by looking at a map of the region. Any overland trade from Asia to Europe, or vice-versa, has four possible routes through the region. The first, through Russia, is no longer an option. The second, through Azerbaijan and Armenia, doesn’t work because of the ongoing conflict between those two countries. The third, through Iran, is obviously problematic. Consequently, the most favorable trade route is through Georgia Furthermore, Western businesses operating in the region seeking to serve Eurasia might have previously picked Russia to export into the Caucasus. That is no longer a possibility. Hence, companies have started to shift their operations to Georgia, given its status as the best place to do business in the region. Heineken’s Georgian subsidiary, for example, recently started exporting from the country to its neighbors. Georgia may only have 3.7 million people, but Azerbaijan has 10 million, Kazakhstan has 19 million, Uzbekistan has 34 million, and the other "Stans" have 22 million people between them. Georgia was already a business hub in the region; the war has provided additional tailwinds.
The second factor—a mass influx of Russians into Georgia—has more than made up for lost tourism due to the conflict. Over the first four months of the war, 50,000 Russians fled to Georgia, where they can stay a year without a visa. Many of these Russians are tech workers who have kept their jobs and are working remotely. Hotels and restaurants in Tbilisi are packed, and the spending has provided a strong boost to the local economy. To quantify the impact of this immigration, assume 10,000 of the immigrating tech workers earn USD$100,000 per year. That equals USD$1b in income. Georgian GDP is only USD$16b. In addition, since Putin’s mass mobilization in September, the number of Russians fleeing to Georgia has increased. At its peak, we understand that as many as 10,000 people were crossing the border from Russian to Georgia per day. This second group of expats are likely lower earners looking to avoid the draft, but they will also have a positive impact on Georgian GDP.
The third factor is remittances. Initially, we were concerned about the potential a drop in remittances from the large number of Georgians living in Russia. There are roughly 400,000 Georgians living in Russia, or more than 10% of the Georgian population. Instead, we think remittances have increased due to the strong ruble and a preference to store capital in Georgia rather than Russia.
These war-related tailwinds would not have been possible without the strong foundation Georgia laid over the past 15 years as the most politically and economically free country in the region. While there is some element of “best house on a bad street”, Georgia has taken advantage of opportunities that have come its way. From a financial perspective, its government debt to GDP is around 50% and is projected to decrease going forward. Inflation is currently down from a peak of 13.8% to 10.9% at the latest reading. The central bank rate is 11%, which is enough for marginal real rates. Next year, inflation is expected to decline to 6%, giving Georgia one of the largest, expected real rates in the world for 2023. In addition, the government has been proactive about signing free-trade agreements with both the EU and China. Plus, the nation’s ease-of-doing-business ranking is top ten globally. All this has helped make Georgia a hub for manufacturing and services in the region and given the country one of strongest ten-year GDP growth rates in the world.
Our investments in the country, TBC Bank and Georgia Capital, are reaping the benefits of this situation. TBC Bank is expected to generate close to a 30% ROE this year in Georgia, while growing loans close to 20% (though still below nominal GDP growth). Despite this, the stock is trading at 0.7x book value and less than 4x earnings this year based on our estimates. Georgia Capital is seeing similar performance in its banking arm, strong growth in its consumer-oriented business, and is selling non-core assets to de-lever and buyback shares. Buying back shares while trading at ~40% of its sum of the parts is a particularly attractive proposition in our opinion.
Sincerely,
Sean Fieler and Brad Virbitsky
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