Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q4 2022 Letter

Dear Partners and Friends,


PERFORMANCE

Kuroto Fund gained 16.8% in the fourth quarter of 2022 bringing the calendar year 2022 return for the fund to -7.9%. By comparison, the EM index gained 9.7% in the fourth quarter of 2022 and declined -20.1% for the full year.


A breakdown of Kuroto Fund's exposures and contribution can be found here.


COMMODITY PESSIMISM PERVADES

Having been out of favor for years, commodities were decimated in the spring of 2020 when global demand collapsed. With almost three years of hindsight, it’s clear that this near-death experience on the back of a lengthy commodity bear market severely traumatized commodity investors and producers alike. Accordingly, even as the commodities have rebounded sharply, pessimism pervades the sector, and commodity producers and investors remain fixated on the return of capital rather than expansion into the nascent bull market in commodities. In our opinion, the prevailing commodity pessimism is not the result of enlightened thinking about supply and demand dynamics but rather the product of the psychological scarring of those invested in commodities and generalist investors who continue to believe that commodity businesses are inherently low return and unpredictable. 

 

 Oil, the largest and most economically important commodity, provides the most glaring example of underinvestment. In 2022, oil producers spent just over $300bn on upstream capital expenditures, down from a peak of over $500 billion. Today’s oil companies are committed to returning the majority of their cash flow to investors who have little faith in the long-term prospects of the businesses. Exxon, the largest of the supermajors, is a case in point. In a December 8th investor presentation, Exxon’s CEO, Darren Woods, reiterated the company’s intention of keeping oil reinvestment well below half of Exxon’s cash flow assuming $60 oil.   With a fortress balance sheet and aggressive return of capital, Exxon is preparing for another bear market, not a commodity super cycle.

Exxon and other oil producers regularly pin their underinvestment on the coming energy transition. However, this argument fails to explain why many other commodities are suffering from the same underinvestment as oil.  For example, copper, which is slated to play a critical role in the energy transition, has experienced almost equally large percentage declines in capital expenditure over recent years. As a result of the underinvestment in copper, by 2026 there is likely to be a significant shortfall in the global copper supply. Eventually correcting this shortfall promises to be extraordinarily painful for consumers of copper given that the average copper project takes over ten years to bring online.  

Generalist investors who don’t want anything to do with commodities deserve much of the blame for the continued underinvestment. Many of these investors were formed by the bull market of the past decade and believe that fortunes are made in tech, not commodities. They point out that there are no trillion-dollar commodity companies and few centi-billionaire commodity companies CEOs because commodity companies don’t lend themselves to differentiation and long-term value creation. Put succinctly, the same investors who were willing to pay any price for tech business also are unwilling to own commodity company at any price. Moreover, even if these investors were to change their mind, many would not know where to begin. An entire generation of investors has never deeply analyzed a commodity business, and most who have, have been turned off by the politics, capital intensity, and cyclicality. 


It is not just equity investors who have become skittish about commodity investing; commodity pessimism extends to participants in the futures market as well.  Oil, in particular, is in severe backwardation, i.e. futures prices are below the spot price. That said, $60 oil implies an unbelievable pessimism about future oil demand.  If this very low price does indeed come to pass, much of the pessimism that prevails in the oil market today is more than justified. Investors in the space own structurally low-return businesses and should extract as much capital as quickly as possible from the sector.

For our part, in contrast to both the stock market and the futures market, we believe that pervasive commodity pessimism has laid the foundation of a massive commodity super cycle.  The supply problems are not going to be cured anytime soon and growing resource nationalism ensures increased friction when markets eventually decide to invest. Perhaps the only thing that could prevent much higher commodity prices across the board would be the implosion of the Chinese economy or a prolonged decline in global economic activity. While the likelihood of these bearish outcomes is not driving the prevailing commodity pessimism, some combination of the two events is likely in our opinion. These downside scenarios would likely be positive for gold and silver prices and not particularly bearish for oil given OPEC’s renewed ability to manage supply. Given this view, our Kuroto Fund weighting in hydrocarbon producers in remains high.

Top 5 Year End Holdings

Please note all figures in above table and below descriptions are in $USD and as of 12/31/2022 unless noted otherwise. Several securities’ prices have moved meaningfully since year-end impacting market capitalization, valuation ratios, etc. 

 

MTN Ghana

MTN Ghana is Ghana’s dominant cellular telecom provider and mobile-money business. The company trades at 3.3x our estimate of 2023 earnings, with a 21% dividend yield, and generates a 50% return on equity. The low valuation is due entirely to the challenge of operating in Ghana.  In 2022, Ghana defaulted on its domestic and U.S. dollar debt and targeted MTN with a series of bespoke taxes.

 

From an operating perspective, MTN Ghana had another strong year.  Through the first nine-months of the year, the company grew revenues 28% and earnings 49% in local currency terms.  MTN gained market share in mobile telephone, increasing its share to 60% of the country’s voice traffic.   In mobile-money, we believe MTN is maintaining its dominant market share.   

 

From a macro perspective, 2022 was a disaster for MTN Ghana.  The Ghanaian Cedi declined over 50% as inflation spiked to more than 50%. Ghana reached an agreement with the IMF in December which should give the government new tools to cut spending. That said, we expect the government to remain dysfunctional in the short term. Over the medium term, Ghana should become a more tolerable country in which to operate as it lives within the constraints of the IMF bailout package. 

 

The larger concern for investors in MTN is the series of direct attacks the government of Ghana has levied against the company. In February of 2022, Ghana’s minister of finance announced approval of a 2% tax on mobile-money transfers. While this tax did not name MTN, with a 90% market share MTN was the obvious fiscal target. As could have been predicted, the 2% transaction tax succeeded in disrupting the mobile-money business while not raising any revenue for the government.  Accordingly, in December, the government of Ghana reduced the 2% tax to a more workable 1%.  Unfortunately, the government followed up this announcement with a politically motivated tax evasion investigation of MTN.  While the substance of the tax evasion charge is dubious to say the least, the continued attack on the company is a problem.

 

In short, MTN is a very healthy company in a very unhealth country.  Safaricom—an analogous company in Kenya—trades at three-and-a-half times the valuation of MTN Ghana. If Ghana becomes a more normal, but not high functioning country like Kenya, then we would expect a substantial rerating of MTN shares. If Ghana continues to attack MTN as the deepest pocket in the country, then MTN’s extraordinarily low multiple is not low enough.  While MTN Ghana was the largest detractor to our performance in 2022, we still think that Ghana is more likely to become an average, rather than a particularly horrible, African country in which to do business.

 

Georgia Capital

Georgia Capital is a diversified holding company in the Republic of Georgia. The company owns a listed and observable 20% stake in Georgia’s second largest bank (Bank of Georgia), and its large portfolio companies include the country’s largest hospital network and largest pharmaceutical store network. Additionally, Georgia Capital owns a diverse portfolio of smaller investments in sectors spanning insurance, real estate, hospitality, utilities, renewable energy, beverages, auto service, and digital services. Georgia Capital trades at 3.5x our estimate of its look-through earnings.

 

The principal reason for Georgia Capital’s low valuation is its $300m 6.125% bond which matures in April of 2024. Even after selling its 80% stake in Georgia’s largest water utility for $180m in February of 2022, Georgia Capital still does not have the liquidity to fully pay its bonds. Our optimism about the company depends upon Georgia Capital’s ability to roll over $200m of the bond or liquidate $200m of its $320m worth of publicly traded securities—or some combination of the two. While the debt does not mature for 15 months, we expect management to execute on a solution in the coming months. 

 

On the back of a solution to its debt rollover, there is good reason to be optimistic about the company’s prospects.  The Georgian economy has been on a tear since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  As we detailed in our Q3 2022 letter, investors were initially concerned about the potential negative spillover that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could have on Georgia.  Instead, the war has had a very positive effect on the country’s businesses, including those owned by Georgia Capital.  This environment has given the company a welcome opportunity to sell assets, retire debt, and buy back shares at discounted prices. 

 

Kosmos Energy

Kosmos Energy is an offshore oil and gas company led by Andy Inglis. Andy joined BP in 1980 and rose through the ranks to become the chief executive of BP’s Exploration and Production business.  At BP, Andy oversaw a multi-billion-dollar exploration budget and was a plausible future BP CEO.  The Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 abruptly changed Andy’s career trajectory. While Andy was not responsible, he along with several of BP’s leaders left or were let go.

 

In 2014, Andy became CEO and Chairman of Kosmos Energy.  For the past eight years he has used his unique skill set and connections to assemble a set of world-class offshore assets in Africa and the Gulf of Mexico.  With a market cap of $3.5b and 2022 free cash flow of approximately $700m, the market is giving Andy little credit for his vison or expertise. We think that’s about to change.

 

In 2023, Kosmos’ flagship Tortue LNG project comes online. The Tortue project is the first of a multi-phase, decade-long natural gas development project in offshore West Africa that is perfectly timed to help Europe meet its newfound need to diversify its natural gas supply. The project is so important that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz paid a visit to Senegal to lobby for Germany’s share of this long-term natural gas supply.

 

More broadly, Andy continues to take advantage of the global exodus from offshore oil and gas development. This exodus has given Kosmos the opportunity to build a world-class portfolio of offshore assets that generate rapid paybacks. When the oil cycle eventually turns, we suspect that the same sort of E&P companies that have been divesting assets and facilitating Kosmos’ growth will become bidders for the package of world-class assets that Andy is assembling.

 

Seplat Energy

Seplat is the largest and most professional indigenous oil and gas company in Nigeria.  The company was founded by two Nigerian entrepreneurs who continue to own close to 10% of the shares each.  Since 2020, the company has been run by Roger Brown, an Irish ex-pat formerly of Standard Bank and PWC, who joined Seplat in 2013 as CFO. The board of directors includes the former head of Shell Nigeria as well as the CEO of Maurel & Prom—a French oil and gas company that owns a 20% stake in Seplat.

 

In 2022, we estimate that Seplat generated roughly $330m of operating cash flow, $170m of free cash flow, and paid a 12% dividend yield.  The company has several projects underway that are scheduled to be completed later this year, including a new gas-liquids development and a new export pipeline.  Once these new projects are up and running,  we estimate that the company will generate roughly $350m of free cash flow per year starting in 2024. On today’s market cap of $700m, this would represent a 50% free cash flow yield. 

 

In addition to the company’s organic growth plans, Seplat has an agreement to purchase part of Exxon’s Nigeria operations. The outcome of this acquisition is political and therefore uncertain. That said, if completed, the deal would double Seplat’s production and cash flow with no share dilution.  As the only respectable indigenous oil and gas company in Nigeria, Seplat is uniquely positioned to acquire additional assets from oil majors who are looking to exit the country.

 

Logo Yazilim

Logo is Turkey’s leading enterprise-resource-planning software (ERP) provider for small and medium businesses. The company trades at 14 times our estimate of 2023 earnings and is well positioned to grow in Turkey’s underpenetrated ERP software sector.  The management, technology, and strategy of Logo continue to impress us.  At the same time, since year-end 2022, we have trimmed our weighting in this holding solely on account of the recent political and macroeconomic developments in Turkey.

 

Turkey’s macroeconomic and political environment has become increasingly unstable. Inflation had been running as high as 85% in October 2022. Moreover, the political and macroeconomic environment will likely come under further stress in the run up to elections on May 14th. We expect Erdogan to pull out all the stops in an effort remain in power, and we anticipate his opposition remains united by their desire to remove him. 

 

While the outcome of Turkey’s election is admittedly unpredictable, either a win for the opposition or Erdogan would likely be a positive for Turkey. The worst-case would be a contested election and/or a coup. An additional non-negligible scenario involves a split government in which Erdogan remains President but loses parliament.  Given the surprisingly strong uptick in the Turkish stock market and strength of the Turkish lira in advance of this uncertainty, we decided to trim our position in Logo.


Sincerely,


Sean Fieler  Brad Virbitsky

end notes

[1] Please note that estimated performance has yet to be audited and is subject to revision. Performance figures constitute confidential information and must not be disclosed to third parties. An investor’s performance may differ based on timing of contributions, withdrawals and participation in new issues.


Unless otherwise noted, all company-specific data derived from internal analysis, company presentations, Bloomberg, FactSet or independent sources. Values as of 12.31.22, unless otherwise noted.

 

This document is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy interests in any product and is being provided for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as legal, tax or investment advice. An offering of interests will be made only by means of a confidential private offering memorandum and only to qualified investors in jurisdictions where permitted by law.

 

An investment is speculative and involves a high degree of risk. There is no secondary market for the investor’s interests and none is expected to develop and there may be restrictions on transferring interests. The Investment Advisor has total trading authority. Performance results are net of fees and expenses and reflect the reinvestment of dividends, interest and other earnings.

 

Prior performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Any investment in a fund involves the risk of loss. Performance can be volatile and an investor could lose all or a substantial portion of his or her investment.

 

The information presented herein is current only as of the particular dates specified for such information, and is subject to change in future periods without notice.

By Kieran Brennan February 26, 2025
Payne Points of Wealth Podcast - "The revenge of Inflation and Kazakhstan"
By Kieran Brennan January 18, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. fell -12.9% in the fourth quarter, finishing the year down – 2.9%. The fund’s performance reflects the lackluster performance of the gold mining sector as well as the underperformance of the companies we own. While there were some clear themes, such as producing companies outperforming exploration companies, our 2024 results are most accurately captured through a description of our six best and six worst performing investments during the year. These twelve companies capture every investment that contributed at least 1%, positive or negative, to our 2024 fund performance. A Challenging Year In 2024, the gold price finished up +27.4%. The GDXJ ETF which tracks the index of junior gold mining producers was up +15.7%. Our portfolio of miners in this fund was down -2.9%. The underperformance of the gold miners as compared to gold largely reflects government participation in the gold market. In 2024, governments bought gold, not gold miners. The poor performance of the gold miners also reflects the sector’s continued subpar returns on capital. The S&P TSX Global Gold universe, a group of large, mature gold miners, only generated an 11% ROE in 2024 and a 5.4% free cash flow yield according to RBC. Despite their inadequate returns on capital, producing miners handily outperformed most exploration and development companies. There remains almost no market for most gold mining companies that are years away from first production. As value investors with contrarian instincts, we have found the increasingly irrational valuations of the pre-revenue companies of particular interest. Often as a project advances, the equity market value of the company declines. These share price declines in turn create a self-reinforcing dynamic in which the small, cash-starved companies underperform because they don’t have access to the capital necessary to move their projects forward. At this point, the downward spiral of pre-revenue gold miners is very extended and nearing a floor in our opinion. Not only are the valuations of these companies incredibly low, but these companies have become increasingly attractive acquisition targets. Although exploration companies are the most severely discounted sector, 54% of our fund remains invested in producing companies. In general, our producing companies trade at a discount to the sector because they are executing on significant capex plans and lack free cash flow. During construction periods, the market can become excessively skeptical. This skepticism, in turn, can present an opportunity to buy high quality assets run by good management teams at attractive valuations. We believe that this is clearly the case at Eldorado Gold, K92 Mining, West African Resources and Adriatic Metals. Overall, our miners are incredibly cheap. Assuming a flat gold price, we estimate our producers will generate a 23.5% IRR. Our companies that do not yet generate any cash flow are cheaper still. Ascot, Thesis, Troilus and Goldquest, for example, have an average IRR of over 30% at current metals prices. Six Winners and Six Losers in 2024 Note: Below IRR is our Equinox internally calculated IRR based on 2024 year-end market prices and forecasted future FCF per share to equity. Borealis Mining: 2024 Performance +29%, IRR 48% Borealis was founded by Kelly Malcolm in 2023 to leverage a large heap leach facility in Nevada by acquiring nearby low-grade heap leach assets. We invested in a pre-IPO round at a $30M post-money valuation. At the time, Borealis had approx. $5M worth of crushed stockpiles, a fully permitted heap leach facility, ~60,000oz of reserves ready to be processed with limited capex and substantial exploration potential at depth. In late 2024, Borealis began to acquire nearby deposits. Borealis purchased Bull Run for $6M in cash. This translates to $14 per ounce for ~500,000oz of already defined resources, and confirms managements intuition that there are small, stranded assets for sale in Nevada. We expect Borealis to continue this acquisition strategy and ramp to become a ~75,000 oz per year producer. K92 Mining: 2024 Performance +22%, IRR 17% K92 controls the world-class Kainantu mine in the highlands of Papua New Guinea. This mine is a high-grade, low-cost asset with a 3 million oz resource at 7g/t. K92 produced 120,000 oz last year, and we expect the company’s Phase 3 expansion will take annual production to over 150,000 oz (gold equivalent) in 2025. While K92 has often struggled to meet its ambitious growth targets, the company has strung together two consecutive quarters of meaningfully higher production with higher than reserve grades. K92 recently expanded the milling capacity which had been a meaningful bottleneck for years. If the company can reach Phase 4, the Kainantu mine’s production will produce ~400,000 oz at a bottom quartile cash cost of <$1000/oz while maintaining a clean balance sheet with minimal leverage. West African Resources: 2024 Performance +38%, IRR 31% In 2024, West African Resources (WAF) remained on-time and on budget in the build of the company’s second mine in Burkina Faso, called Kiaka. Once Kiaka is commissioned in Q3 2025, WAF will be a ~450,000 oz annual producer for the next 10 years. While the construction has proceeded as expected, WAF was adversely impacted by the local content language in Burkina Faso’s new mining code. Rather than pay the resulting mark up in their rental of local equipment, WAF elected to purchase their mining fleet outright. This decision added $150 million to the company’s capital budget and resulted in a July equity raise of the same amount. While we were disappointed with the need for more equity capital, ultimately the raise will accelerate WAF’s buy-back and dividend plans. If the company continues to trade at the current valuation, we expect the board will announce a sizable share repurchase as soon as the company’s debt is repaid. Hochschild Mining: 2024 Performance +96%, IRR 18% Hochschild Mining (HOC) is a proven mine builder with the strategy of reinvesting free cash flow into new projects to grow production. In 2024, we visited their newly commissioned mine in Brazil, called Mara Rosa, which was successfully built on time and on budget. Mara Rosa will deliver a 20%+ project level IRR and highlights HOC's competence in executing medium-size projects in Latin America. We expect the company will be able to repeat this success with another mine in Brazil, the Monte Do Carmo project in the neighboring state of Tocantins. Big picture, HOC is a family-owned business with a goal of producing 500,000 ounces of gold per year by 2030. While we would prefer a return on capital goal rather than a growth target, we appreciate the straight-forward way the company organizes its operations, and we believe the company will not undertake projects with less than a 20% cash on cash IRR. Moreover, unlike many growth miners, when the company reaches their targeted 500,000 ounces of annual production – anticipated for 2030 - we expect HOC to transition to return free cash flow to shareholders. Galiano Gold: 2024 Performance +35%, IRR 29% Galiano has been busily working on a new mine plan which will be released on January 28th. We expect the company’s production guidance will increase as Galiano elects to move forward with the redevelopment of their higher grade Nkran pit. We also expect increased exploration spending in 2025 as the company ramps up work on their newly consolidated land package. We are expecting Galiano to guide to a production target of approx. 250,000 ounces per year by 2027. Even at this higher rate of production, we anticipate the company will be able to more than replace reserves given the prospectivity of the Asankrangwa gold belt in which they operate. While Galiano will have to reinvest the vast majority of its cash flow in growth in 2025 and 2026, the company should become a substantial free cash flow generator beginning in 2027. Solidcore Resources: 2024 Performance +22%, IRR 21% Solidcore, a spin-out from Polymetal, is a new position in our fund. Solidcore is run by CEO Vitaly Nesis, and controlled by Oman’s sovereign wealth fund. The company operates two long-lived mines in Kazakhstan and produces 480,000 ounces of gold annually at a competitive All-In Sustaining Cost (AISC) of $1,300/oz. With an EV/EBITDA multiple of 2.2x, Solidcore trades at an almost 50% discount to its peers. This undervaluation is largely due to the company’s sole listing on the Astana International Exchange in Kazakhstan. We expect Solidcore to generate roughly $400 million in free cash flow per year at current gold prices. In 2025 and 2026, this free cash flow will be invested in a new pressure oxidation autoclave. Beginning in 2027, we anticipate that $100 million USD of the company’s free cash flow will be distributed to shareholders. This prospective dividend along with the company’s plan to re-list on the London Stock Exchange offers two catalysts that should drive a significant re-rating. Orezone Gold: 2024 Performance -30%, IRR 27% While Orezone completed its initial build on time and on budget, the company failed to generate the free cash flow necessary to internally finance the expansion of its operations in Burkina Faso. The company’s reliance on high-cost diesel generators and an unreliable power grid proved particularly problematic. Largely due to higher-than-expected power costs, the midpoint of their AISC guidance increased by $100/oz from last year’s projection of $1,338/oz. Despite the elevated power costs, Orezone successfully closed their financing for the hard rock processing plant in December 2024. This financing will enable Orezone to increase annual production from approx. 120,000 oz in 2024 to ~180,000 oz in 2026. We expect 2025 to be a pivotal year for the company as they will begin to generate sufficient cash to pay down debt and continue building towards their 250,000 oz/year target. We are also encouraged by the company’s ongoing exploration program which has the potential to increase the Bombore’s mine life at higher grades. C3 Metals: 2024 Performance -62% C3 stock declined significantly in 2024 even as the company made significant progress advancing their projects in both Jamaica and Peru. With respect to their Jamaican asset, C3 Metals signed a joint venture agreement with the Stewart family, one of the wealthiest families on the island. C3 is now well-positioned to do a JV deal with a larger international mining company that can finance the costly deep holes necessary to test the porphyry copper deposit’s potential. In Peru, C3 Metals received a permit to access one of its land packages located just 40 kilometers east of MMG’s Las Bambas mine. This permit, which took years to secure, opens the door for further exploration in a proven copper-rich region. With the permit in hand, C3 Metals should be able to bring in a larger partner to drill out the asset. Troilus Gold: 2024 Performance -45%, IRR 35% In May 2024, Troilus submitted its feasibility study to the Canadian government. This new study detailed their plan to develop a 22-year open pit mine that would produce approx. 300,000 oz of gold per year. With current gold prices north of $2,600 and copper hovering around $4, the project will likely move forward. The company has received financial support from a handful of export credit agencies interested in its 10% copper production. Troilus is also in the final stages of submitting the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (“ESIA”), another key milestone as they advance towards construction. Located 300 kilometers north of Chibougamau, Quebec, the Troilus project is a brownfield site in a favorable mining jurisdiction with the potential to become a Top 10 copper gold project in Canada. We are fans of CEO Justin Reid and believe in his ability to permit the project and advance it towards becoming a premier North American copper-gold producer. At a $4/oz equity market cap to gold equivalent ounces in ground ratio, we believe Troilus is one of Canada’s best leveraged investments to rising gold and copper prices. Ascot Resources: 2024 Performance -23%, IRR 38% Ascot Resources put its Premier gold project on care & maintenance in September of 2024. At the time, the company didn’t have enough ore coming from the underground mine to profitably operate the 2,500 tonnes per day mill. To rectify the lack of available ore, the company raised $43 million, extended the term of their debt, and decided to invest in an additional 2,500 meters of development before commissioning the mill. The board then made a change at CEO and brought in Jim Currie for his extensive underground mining experience and added our own Coille Van Alphen to the board. Underground development is currently underway, and we expect the mill to restart in Q2 2025. One more injection of capital will likely be required to ensure the company has a sufficient working capital buffer as they restart the mill. When the mine reaches commercial production, it will be able to generate a sustainable ~$100m of FCF per year which should translate into a stock price of at least $1 CAD per share. Great Pacific Gold: 2024 Performance -47% Great Pacific owns two highly prospective gold exploration projects in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Over the course of 2024, the company refined its exploration targets and drilled 5000m at its Kesar project in the highlands of PNG. The Kesar project looks to be an extension of nearby K92’s mine, and as such may be sold to K92. Great Pacific will begin drilling exploration targets at its second PNG property in Q2 of 2025. This property is a brownfield site with past production at a grade of more than 10 g/t. Great Pacific has a third asset in Australia, which we believe could be sold to fund the company’s exploration activities in PNG. Great Pacific is led by an excellent CEO in Greg McCunn. We got to know Greg through a previous investment in West Africa. As CEO, he brings the necessary vision, discipline, and accountability to an exploration company. We believe the company will deliver exploration success at their two PNG assets and ultimately enable Greg to create shareholder value in a variety of ways. GoGold Resources: 2024 Performance -24%, IRR 30% GoGold has been waiting two years for its permit in Mexico. The delay was caused by the previous Mexican President Andres Manual Lopez Obrador’s (AMLO) staunch opposition to new mining development. In the end, while neither of AMLO’s major proposed changes to the mining code passed, few mining permits of any kind were issued during his time in office. GoGold’s large cash buffer and existing heap leach operation enabled the company to wait out AMLO without needing to raise additional equity capital. We think their patience will soon be rewarded as the new administration of President Claudia Sheinbaum plans to process permit applications on their technical merits. In GoGold’s case, the technical merits of their Los Ricos South project are exceptionally strong with over 100 million oz of silver at an average grade of 276 g/t. Sincerely, Equinox Partners Investment Management
By Kieran Brennan January 17, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. declined -6.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024, finishing the calendar year 2024 up +17.7% net of all fees. Our poor performance in the fourth quarter was driven by a sharp selloff in gold and silver miners despite a flat gold price during the period. 2024 Year in Review Crew Energy accounted for 100% of our fund’s performance in 2024. We offered a fulsome write-up of Crew in our third quarter letter and need not repeat the details of the acquisition by Tourmaline here, other than to note that the 72% premium resulted in an ~18% contribution to the fund’s total return. While there was significant movement among our other investments, their aggregate contribution was close to zero. This is a disappointing result given the significant progress many of our companies made last year. The market was not impressed by Paramount Resources’ sale of its core asset to Ovintiv for $3.3bn CAD. Nor did the market seem to care that Kosmos energy finally brought its flagship Tortue asset online in December. Thesis Gold’s positive feasibility study elicited an initial positive reaction, which was quickly reversed. Elsewhere, the market remains totally indifferent to the rapid progress that West African Resources is making at their Kiaka asset. While we understand that our sectors are out of favor, we would hope to see at least some of the value they are creating reflected in their stock prices in 2025. We’ve been busy over the past six months, establishing several sizable, new positions. We sold half of the Tourmaline shares we received in consideration for our Crew shares and used funds to make the following investments: an 11% portfolio weight in Solidcore Resources, an 8% position in Kosmos Energy, a 5% weighting in Ensign Energy, and a 5% weight in Gran Tierra Energy. Solidcore and Kosmos are both top five positions and receive a full writeup in the letter that follows. Ensign Energy is a North American energy service company, and Gran Tierra Energy is an E&P company with assets in Latin America and Canada. Both Ensign and Gran Tierra trade at particularly compelling valuations. investment Thesis Review for our top 5 Long Positions by Weight
By Kieran Brennan January 17, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. appreciated +6.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and finished the year up +11.1%. Performance for the quarter was driven primarily by the positive performance our operating company holdings in Nigeria, Ghana, and Georgia. A breakdown of Kuroto Fund exposures can be found here . 2024 Year in Review Kuroto’s top five investments made large strides last year. Seplat completed its ExxonMobil Nigeria acquisition, more than doubling its production, cash flow and reserves. Georgia Capital successfully sold a non-core asset and is in a good position to buy back a lot of stock this year. MTN Ghana saw strong operational performance while Ghana’s economy and currency stabilized. Guaranty Trust Bank completed a government-mandated equity raise, and Nigeria made steps towards stabilizing its economy. Lastly, Kosmos brought on its long-delayed Tortue LNG project. In each case, we believe the market has not adequately factored in the progress our companies have made, and we anticipate a more fulsome rerating of our top holdings in 2025.
By Kieran Brennan November 1, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. rose +3.1% in the third quarter and is up +11.0% through the end of September 2024. Performance for the quarter was driven primarily by our group of explorers, with additional positive contribution coming from the producing segment of the portfolio. These gains were partially offset by the decline of one of our development stage companies which has experienced delays and raised additional capital. As our gold miners have lagged the indices, a substantial valuation gap has opened between the largest gold miners in the industry and the producing companies we own. At spot pricing, consensus sell-side models have Agnico, Barrick, Kinross and Newmont delivering an IRR of just 3%. Our portfolio of producers, on the other hand, models out to an IRR of 20% using the same metals price assumptions. There's substantial value in the gold mining sector, but the largest companies are not the ones to own.
By Kieran Brennan October 31, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. declined -0.8% in the third quarter of 2024 and is up +4.2% for the year through September 30 th . Performance for the quarter was driven by a pullback in our energy holdings, which more than offset the gains in MTN Ghana and several of our financials. A breakdown of Kuroto Fund exposures can be found here . Kuroto Fund's Energy Investments Since SUmmer of 2020 Kuroto Fund began adding oil producers to the portfolio in August 2020. Today, we own four oil companies. Cumulatively, our portfolio of oil companies have added $5mn to our P&L, but more than all of this performance has come from one company, Seplat. By our calculation Seplat will be generating a free cash flow yield of ~28% once it consummates the acquisition of Exxon Mobil Nigeria early next year. While our remaining portfolio of oil companies, in aggregate, have yet to contribute positively to our returns, they are executing and delivering strong fundamental progress. One of these portfolio companies we expect will complete an acquisition this month that should increase production by 60%. Two others should bring on long-delayed fields before year-end and we expect all three to release meaningful exploration results over the next six months. 
By Kieran Brennan October 31, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. rose +16.4% in the third quarter of 2024 and is up +25.9% for the year through September 30th. The positive performance for the quarter was driven by the revaluation of our largest position, Crew Energy, which was up +70% in the quarter on the news it would be acquired by Tourmaline Oil. A breakdown of Equinox Partners exposures can be found here . Crew Energy Investment Post-Mortem On October 1st, Tourmaline Oil acquired Crew Energy bringing a decade-long Equinox Partners’ investment to a successful conclusion. Crew transacted for $1.15 billion USD, which included $960MM USD in Tourmaline shares and $190MM USD of assumed debt. The 72% premium Tourmaline paid resulted in an 11.6% IRR on our investment. This IRR, however, understates the positive impact Crew has had on our performance in recent years. Since we upsized our investment in Crew in the spring of 2020, Crew has been the most significant driver of our fund’s returns. Over the entire life of the investment, Crew contributed a cumulative +139% to our fund’s performance. Accordingly, we felt an investment review is in order. Attracted by Crew Energy’s low-cost and long-lived natural gas reserves in British Columbia, we first invested in December of 2014. At the time of our initial purchase, the Canadian natural gas strip averaged CAD $3.75. If strip prices held, Crew would be able to grow its production at 20%+ per year for a decade with internally generated cash flow. While our thesis about the quality of Crew’s assets was accurate, our assumptions about natural gas prices in North America proved too optimistic. The North American natural benchmark, Henry Hub, averaged just USD $3.09 over the past decade, and the Western Canada benchmark, AECO, fared even worse averaging CAD $2.59. 
By Kieran Brennan July 24, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. rose +2.1% in the second quarter, and is up +7.7% for the 2024 year-to-date through the end of June. Our portfolio of producing gold companies have been the primary drivers of contribution to return, while the early stage explorers and developers have traded down despite the rising metals price. A breakdown of Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund's exposures can be found here . Gold Miners vs. Gold
By Kieran Brennan July 24, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. rose +5.7% in the second quarter of 2024. The positive performance for the quarter was primarily driven by our mining positions, with additional positive contribution from our energy companies. A breakdown of Equinox Partners exposures can be found here . Gold Miners vs. Gold 
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