Equinox Partners Precious Metals, L.P. - Q1 2020 Letter

Dear Partners and Friends,

Top-five holdings Coronavirus update


Pan American Silver: Market Cap: $3.4b / Net Debt: $78m

All of Pan American’s mines except for Timmins (about 6.5% of NAV) have been placed on care & maintenance due to the coronavirus, and the company has pulled production/cost guidance for the year. With net debt of $78m, $240m available on its credit facility, and no significant capex projects planned for this year, Pan American can navigate the current environment without much trouble. The management team has taken a 20% reduction in salary in a show of solidarity with their employees who are currently being paid their base salary. 

 

2019 was a transformative year for Pan American with the closing of the Tahoe transaction and the release of an initial resource for the polymetallic skarn deposit at its La Colorada mine. The company reported an initial inferred resource at La Colorada of ~73 million tonnes, which we value at ~$1B. During Q1 2020, the company released additional drill results for the skarn deposit which were higher grade than the inferred resource, suggesting the skarn will continue to grow and its economics improve. 

 

With a strong balance sheet and nine silver mines in five countries in the Americas, Pan American is well positioned to weather the current storm and benefit from higher silver prices going forward. With over one-third of the world’s silver supply currently offline and investor demand for silver surging, we expect silver prices to rise in the near future.[1]

 

MAG Silver: Market Cap: $741m / Net Cash: $72m

We’ve pushed our estimate of MAG’s production startup out 6+ months, to the first half of 2021. All the equipment necessary for construction is on site and the joint venture’s construction crews were still working as of April 5th. That said, we believe that there is good reason to expect a delay in the construction given the logistical challenges posed by the coronavirus.


The delay in construction will slow the rate at which MAG spends its remaining cash. The company had USD$72m in cash as of Dec 31. We expect MAG will need an additional USD$50m in the next twelve months due to cost overruns plus another year of G&A. MAG will likely borrow these additional funds in the second quarter when its construction timeline is clarified.


Our estimates for the joint venture once it begins production remain unchanged. Tonnage will begin at 4,000 tonnes per day (tpd) and increase to 8,000 tpd within a few years of initial production. At 8,000 tpd, the JV will have a stated mine-life in excess of 12 years and a functional mine-life of much longer. The JV has increased its exploration budget to $5m to build on the promising results in late 2019. We expect the JV will identify another mine on the property in the next few years.


At $18 silver and 4,000 tpd, the JV generates a 44% IRR with a cash cost of ~$5 per ounce of silver. At 8,000 tpd, the project’s IRR rises, the cash cost falls, and MAG’s portion of the JV’s free cash flow tops USD$100m per year and generates a FCF yield in excess of 13%. In the first year of commercial production, we anticipate that the JV’s free cash flow will be reinvested in the expansion to 8,000 tpd. After that expansion, we expect MAG’s board to either reinvest the company’s free cash flow into high-return projects on the JV property or to return the free cash flow to shareholders via dividends and share buybacks.

 

Sandstorm: Market Cap: $982m / Net Debt: $0m

We expect Sandstorm to be profitable in the second quarter despite the halving of its revenue due to mine shutdowns. Within its portfolio, the most notable suspensions and reduced operations are Yamana’s Cerro Morro, Lundin Gold’s Fruta Del Norte, and First Majestic’s Santa Elena. Assuming a 3-month stoppage at the affected mines, 12.5% of Sandstorm’s 2020 attributable production will be shifted to future years. Accordingly, we’ve reduced our estimate of Sandstorm’s free cash flow to just $7m for the quarter.

 

With ~$300m USD in credit lines available and no debt, Standstorm has an opportunity to acquire incremental assets at attractive prices given the current stress in the mining sector. Sandstorm has also just renewed its stock repurchase program. The company repurchased 3.7m of its own shares during the market volatility in March. Either through acquiring royalties at a great price or buying its own undervalued portfolio through share repurchase, Sandstorm has the ability and the willingness to grow value for shareholders. We expect CEO Nolan Watson and his team to consummate at least one opportunistic deal in the next few months.

 

Longer term, we believe that the market is making a mistake by not attributing any value to Sandstorm’s 30% equity stake in the Hod Maden mine in Turkey. When Hod Maden goes into production, currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2022, we expect the asset to almost double Sandstorm’s cash flows.


Dundee Precious: Market Cap: $680m / Net Cash: $50m

With no large capital requirements, no net debt, and Ada Tepe’s ramp up complete, Dundee Precious Metals is in a very favorable position. We estimate that they exited Q1 with a $50m net cash position. The company’s coronavirus impact has been minimal: both of its mines continue to operate without interruption, while the smelter is still running at ~80% of its current capacity. As a result, the company is on track to generate in excess of $175m in operating cash flow in 2020.


Dundee Precious Metals is also well positioned to acquire another company for a bargain price or to acquire a meaningful amount of its own shares. Either option should benefit shareholders materially. For the share buyback to be effective, the company will need to make a tender offer. They could do so for up to 25% of the shares outstanding and still exit the year in a net cash position. As for acquisitions, the company has been reviewing targets for more than a year. The pricing for such an acquisition is obviously more favorable now. We believe that either buying back stock or making an acquisition would be wise in the current environment. The mistake would be to do neither.


CEO Rick Howes is scheduled to be replaced in May at Dundee’s AGM by COO David Rae. David is sharp, competent, and offers Dundee operational continuity that is especially important in these more uncertain times.


Goldmoney: Market Cap: $130m; Net Cash $51

Goldmoney is one of the obvious beneficiaries from the stress in the physical market for gold and silver. With retail investors unable to purchase physical coins at reasonable premiums, and growing uncertainty surrounding the physical backing of the gold and silver ETFs, Goldmoney’s user-friendly physical storage services for gold and silver bullion around the world are poised to benefit.

 

The Goldmoney’s portfolio consists of four principal businesses: Goldmoney.com, Mene, Schiff Gold, and a gold-lending platform. Goldmoney.com is a precious metals holding platform which allows customers to buy and take delivery of physical metals in secured locations for a lower cost than coins or ETFs. Mene crafts pure 24-karat gold and platinum jewelry that is sold by gram weight with a 20-30% premium. These are, in effect, gold investments in the form of jewelry. Schiff Gold is a U.S. dealer of physical metals in the form of bars, coins and wafers. Finally, Lend & Borrow Trust is an online lending platform that enables peer-to-peer lending and borrowing collateralized by precious metals.


Goldmoney’s CEO, Roy Sebag, who began his carrier at Paypal, has spent the last four years building Goldmoney’s retail transaction platform. While the regulations allow for such a business to work in theory, in practice the regulators in both the U.S. and Canada stopped Roy from developing a gold-transaction business. Accordingly, Goldmoney has stopped investing in its transaction business and refocused on building its gold and silver investment businesses.

 

p/NAV of Gold miners

In the first quarter of 2020, gold prices were up and the price of gold mining companies were down. BMO’s long-term graph of the P/NAV (with a 0% discount rate) for their coverage universe of senior and junior producers provides a sense of how depressed today’s valuations are. As the graph shows, seniors which traded at a ~50% premium to NAV after the lows of 2015, are now trading at a meaningful discount to NAV, while the juniors are trading at an unbelievable 80% discount to NAV. The gold price and mining valuations are clearly disconnected, especially for the juniors that have traded at an increasingly large discount to NAV as the gold price has risen in recent years. The current combination of strong gold prices and low prices for gold mining companies presents an opportunity to invest in the space at a time when its underlying fundamentals are very strong and valuations are low.  

mine closures

“296 mines globally have been temporarily shut down due to the corona virus as of April 6th. 178 (60%) are precious metal operations,” according to fund manager Marin Katusa. These closures have impacted our portfolio unevenly. Broadly speaking, our operations in Australia, Bulgaria, Ontario, Sweden, and West Africa have fared the best so far. We are also witnessing a number of exceptions on a mine-by-mine basis. MAG Silver’s construction site, for example, was still in operation through April 6th, despite the shutdown of most mines in Mexico.


We expect the broad restrictions on mining activity to be lifted in May and June, with the specific timing of the restarts varying from country to country. We are encouraged by the restart of some refining capacity in Switzerland, and we have yet to hear of companies being unable to monetize the metal they produce. 


abnormalities in the gold market

“Some dealers are desperately contacting clients to see if anyone is willing to sell their gold bars and coins, and offering a rare premium over spot prices.”[2] Even at premium prices, there are few sellers of gold and silver coins into the retail channel. This has led to coin shortages and high premiums to spot prices. Current premiums for a one-ounce gold or silver round are over USD$100 for gold and over $5 for silver.[3] These premiums are a result of surging demand, low inventory and supply limitations caused by flight cancellations, and the widespread shutdown of precious metals refiners and mints.


The pricing discrepancies within the institutional precious metals markets are more difficult to explain and more important to understand. The most glaring anomaly is the differential between the COMEX future price and the spot LBMA price. This differential has remained large and volatile in April as other spreads in the capital market have normalized. Accordingly, there is growing speculation that the spread between COMEX gold and LBMA gold signals a deeper problem with the physical backing of these exchanges.


The LBMA issued two press releases last week to diffuse the situation. The market was not reassured: LMBA is trading at a $36 discount to COMEX gold as we write. With the LBMA holding over 8,326 tonnes of gold in storage (USD$407b) as of December 31, 2019,[4] the financial implications of this discount are non-negligible.  Should LBMA gold continue to trade at such a substantial discount to COMEX, the credible allegations that the LBMA failed to fulfill some of its contractual obligations will gain additional credence.[5]


It is worth noting that the GLD and IAU ETFs are dependent on the performance of the LBMA and its sub-custodians. As such, questions about the integrity of the LBMA and its sub-custodians raise important red flags for the $80b+ of capital currently invested in gold ETF’s. Surprisingly, these two ETF continue to experience inflows.  GLD alone has recorded estimated inflows of USD$3.9b since March 23rd.[6] Given the difficulties many have experienced sourcing physical gold recently, we are not alone in publically questioning these ETFs’ ability to successfully translate these massive dollar inflows into physical gold.[7]







Sincerely,


Sean Fieler 

ENDNOTES

[1] Silver Shock Update, Jeff Clark, March 31, 2020



[2] Source: Bloomberg News.


[3] For example, the cheapest silver round at APMEX on April 7th trades at premium of $5.30/oz for a bulk 500-oz order of silver rounds, while their cheapest gold round enjoys a hefty premium of $178.


[4] Source: LBMA.


[5] Source: Numismatic News.


[6] Source: Reuters; Bloomberg data.


[7] Source: Bloomberg News.

By Kieran Brennan February 26, 2025
Payne Points of Wealth Podcast - "The revenge of Inflation and Kazakhstan"
By Kieran Brennan January 18, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. fell -12.9% in the fourth quarter, finishing the year down – 2.9%. The fund’s performance reflects the lackluster performance of the gold mining sector as well as the underperformance of the companies we own. While there were some clear themes, such as producing companies outperforming exploration companies, our 2024 results are most accurately captured through a description of our six best and six worst performing investments during the year. These twelve companies capture every investment that contributed at least 1%, positive or negative, to our 2024 fund performance. A Challenging Year In 2024, the gold price finished up +27.4%. The GDXJ ETF which tracks the index of junior gold mining producers was up +15.7%. Our portfolio of miners in this fund was down -2.9%. The underperformance of the gold miners as compared to gold largely reflects government participation in the gold market. In 2024, governments bought gold, not gold miners. The poor performance of the gold miners also reflects the sector’s continued subpar returns on capital. The S&P TSX Global Gold universe, a group of large, mature gold miners, only generated an 11% ROE in 2024 and a 5.4% free cash flow yield according to RBC. Despite their inadequate returns on capital, producing miners handily outperformed most exploration and development companies. There remains almost no market for most gold mining companies that are years away from first production. As value investors with contrarian instincts, we have found the increasingly irrational valuations of the pre-revenue companies of particular interest. Often as a project advances, the equity market value of the company declines. These share price declines in turn create a self-reinforcing dynamic in which the small, cash-starved companies underperform because they don’t have access to the capital necessary to move their projects forward. At this point, the downward spiral of pre-revenue gold miners is very extended and nearing a floor in our opinion. Not only are the valuations of these companies incredibly low, but these companies have become increasingly attractive acquisition targets. Although exploration companies are the most severely discounted sector, 54% of our fund remains invested in producing companies. In general, our producing companies trade at a discount to the sector because they are executing on significant capex plans and lack free cash flow. During construction periods, the market can become excessively skeptical. This skepticism, in turn, can present an opportunity to buy high quality assets run by good management teams at attractive valuations. We believe that this is clearly the case at Eldorado Gold, K92 Mining, West African Resources and Adriatic Metals. Overall, our miners are incredibly cheap. Assuming a flat gold price, we estimate our producers will generate a 23.5% IRR. Our companies that do not yet generate any cash flow are cheaper still. Ascot, Thesis, Troilus and Goldquest, for example, have an average IRR of over 30% at current metals prices. Six Winners and Six Losers in 2024 Note: Below IRR is our Equinox internally calculated IRR based on 2024 year-end market prices and forecasted future FCF per share to equity. Borealis Mining: 2024 Performance +29%, IRR 48% Borealis was founded by Kelly Malcolm in 2023 to leverage a large heap leach facility in Nevada by acquiring nearby low-grade heap leach assets. We invested in a pre-IPO round at a $30M post-money valuation. At the time, Borealis had approx. $5M worth of crushed stockpiles, a fully permitted heap leach facility, ~60,000oz of reserves ready to be processed with limited capex and substantial exploration potential at depth. In late 2024, Borealis began to acquire nearby deposits. Borealis purchased Bull Run for $6M in cash. This translates to $14 per ounce for ~500,000oz of already defined resources, and confirms managements intuition that there are small, stranded assets for sale in Nevada. We expect Borealis to continue this acquisition strategy and ramp to become a ~75,000 oz per year producer. K92 Mining: 2024 Performance +22%, IRR 17% K92 controls the world-class Kainantu mine in the highlands of Papua New Guinea. This mine is a high-grade, low-cost asset with a 3 million oz resource at 7g/t. K92 produced 120,000 oz last year, and we expect the company’s Phase 3 expansion will take annual production to over 150,000 oz (gold equivalent) in 2025. While K92 has often struggled to meet its ambitious growth targets, the company has strung together two consecutive quarters of meaningfully higher production with higher than reserve grades. K92 recently expanded the milling capacity which had been a meaningful bottleneck for years. If the company can reach Phase 4, the Kainantu mine’s production will produce ~400,000 oz at a bottom quartile cash cost of <$1000/oz while maintaining a clean balance sheet with minimal leverage. West African Resources: 2024 Performance +38%, IRR 31% In 2024, West African Resources (WAF) remained on-time and on budget in the build of the company’s second mine in Burkina Faso, called Kiaka. Once Kiaka is commissioned in Q3 2025, WAF will be a ~450,000 oz annual producer for the next 10 years. While the construction has proceeded as expected, WAF was adversely impacted by the local content language in Burkina Faso’s new mining code. Rather than pay the resulting mark up in their rental of local equipment, WAF elected to purchase their mining fleet outright. This decision added $150 million to the company’s capital budget and resulted in a July equity raise of the same amount. While we were disappointed with the need for more equity capital, ultimately the raise will accelerate WAF’s buy-back and dividend plans. If the company continues to trade at the current valuation, we expect the board will announce a sizable share repurchase as soon as the company’s debt is repaid. Hochschild Mining: 2024 Performance +96%, IRR 18% Hochschild Mining (HOC) is a proven mine builder with the strategy of reinvesting free cash flow into new projects to grow production. In 2024, we visited their newly commissioned mine in Brazil, called Mara Rosa, which was successfully built on time and on budget. Mara Rosa will deliver a 20%+ project level IRR and highlights HOC's competence in executing medium-size projects in Latin America. We expect the company will be able to repeat this success with another mine in Brazil, the Monte Do Carmo project in the neighboring state of Tocantins. Big picture, HOC is a family-owned business with a goal of producing 500,000 ounces of gold per year by 2030. While we would prefer a return on capital goal rather than a growth target, we appreciate the straight-forward way the company organizes its operations, and we believe the company will not undertake projects with less than a 20% cash on cash IRR. Moreover, unlike many growth miners, when the company reaches their targeted 500,000 ounces of annual production – anticipated for 2030 - we expect HOC to transition to return free cash flow to shareholders. Galiano Gold: 2024 Performance +35%, IRR 29% Galiano has been busily working on a new mine plan which will be released on January 28th. We expect the company’s production guidance will increase as Galiano elects to move forward with the redevelopment of their higher grade Nkran pit. We also expect increased exploration spending in 2025 as the company ramps up work on their newly consolidated land package. We are expecting Galiano to guide to a production target of approx. 250,000 ounces per year by 2027. Even at this higher rate of production, we anticipate the company will be able to more than replace reserves given the prospectivity of the Asankrangwa gold belt in which they operate. While Galiano will have to reinvest the vast majority of its cash flow in growth in 2025 and 2026, the company should become a substantial free cash flow generator beginning in 2027. Solidcore Resources: 2024 Performance +22%, IRR 21% Solidcore, a spin-out from Polymetal, is a new position in our fund. Solidcore is run by CEO Vitaly Nesis, and controlled by Oman’s sovereign wealth fund. The company operates two long-lived mines in Kazakhstan and produces 480,000 ounces of gold annually at a competitive All-In Sustaining Cost (AISC) of $1,300/oz. With an EV/EBITDA multiple of 2.2x, Solidcore trades at an almost 50% discount to its peers. This undervaluation is largely due to the company’s sole listing on the Astana International Exchange in Kazakhstan. We expect Solidcore to generate roughly $400 million in free cash flow per year at current gold prices. In 2025 and 2026, this free cash flow will be invested in a new pressure oxidation autoclave. Beginning in 2027, we anticipate that $100 million USD of the company’s free cash flow will be distributed to shareholders. This prospective dividend along with the company’s plan to re-list on the London Stock Exchange offers two catalysts that should drive a significant re-rating. Orezone Gold: 2024 Performance -30%, IRR 27% While Orezone completed its initial build on time and on budget, the company failed to generate the free cash flow necessary to internally finance the expansion of its operations in Burkina Faso. The company’s reliance on high-cost diesel generators and an unreliable power grid proved particularly problematic. Largely due to higher-than-expected power costs, the midpoint of their AISC guidance increased by $100/oz from last year’s projection of $1,338/oz. Despite the elevated power costs, Orezone successfully closed their financing for the hard rock processing plant in December 2024. This financing will enable Orezone to increase annual production from approx. 120,000 oz in 2024 to ~180,000 oz in 2026. We expect 2025 to be a pivotal year for the company as they will begin to generate sufficient cash to pay down debt and continue building towards their 250,000 oz/year target. We are also encouraged by the company’s ongoing exploration program which has the potential to increase the Bombore’s mine life at higher grades. C3 Metals: 2024 Performance -62% C3 stock declined significantly in 2024 even as the company made significant progress advancing their projects in both Jamaica and Peru. With respect to their Jamaican asset, C3 Metals signed a joint venture agreement with the Stewart family, one of the wealthiest families on the island. C3 is now well-positioned to do a JV deal with a larger international mining company that can finance the costly deep holes necessary to test the porphyry copper deposit’s potential. In Peru, C3 Metals received a permit to access one of its land packages located just 40 kilometers east of MMG’s Las Bambas mine. This permit, which took years to secure, opens the door for further exploration in a proven copper-rich region. With the permit in hand, C3 Metals should be able to bring in a larger partner to drill out the asset. Troilus Gold: 2024 Performance -45%, IRR 35% In May 2024, Troilus submitted its feasibility study to the Canadian government. This new study detailed their plan to develop a 22-year open pit mine that would produce approx. 300,000 oz of gold per year. With current gold prices north of $2,600 and copper hovering around $4, the project will likely move forward. The company has received financial support from a handful of export credit agencies interested in its 10% copper production. Troilus is also in the final stages of submitting the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (“ESIA”), another key milestone as they advance towards construction. Located 300 kilometers north of Chibougamau, Quebec, the Troilus project is a brownfield site in a favorable mining jurisdiction with the potential to become a Top 10 copper gold project in Canada. We are fans of CEO Justin Reid and believe in his ability to permit the project and advance it towards becoming a premier North American copper-gold producer. At a $4/oz equity market cap to gold equivalent ounces in ground ratio, we believe Troilus is one of Canada’s best leveraged investments to rising gold and copper prices. Ascot Resources: 2024 Performance -23%, IRR 38% Ascot Resources put its Premier gold project on care & maintenance in September of 2024. At the time, the company didn’t have enough ore coming from the underground mine to profitably operate the 2,500 tonnes per day mill. To rectify the lack of available ore, the company raised $43 million, extended the term of their debt, and decided to invest in an additional 2,500 meters of development before commissioning the mill. The board then made a change at CEO and brought in Jim Currie for his extensive underground mining experience and added our own Coille Van Alphen to the board. Underground development is currently underway, and we expect the mill to restart in Q2 2025. One more injection of capital will likely be required to ensure the company has a sufficient working capital buffer as they restart the mill. When the mine reaches commercial production, it will be able to generate a sustainable ~$100m of FCF per year which should translate into a stock price of at least $1 CAD per share. Great Pacific Gold: 2024 Performance -47% Great Pacific owns two highly prospective gold exploration projects in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Over the course of 2024, the company refined its exploration targets and drilled 5000m at its Kesar project in the highlands of PNG. The Kesar project looks to be an extension of nearby K92’s mine, and as such may be sold to K92. Great Pacific will begin drilling exploration targets at its second PNG property in Q2 of 2025. This property is a brownfield site with past production at a grade of more than 10 g/t. Great Pacific has a third asset in Australia, which we believe could be sold to fund the company’s exploration activities in PNG. Great Pacific is led by an excellent CEO in Greg McCunn. We got to know Greg through a previous investment in West Africa. As CEO, he brings the necessary vision, discipline, and accountability to an exploration company. We believe the company will deliver exploration success at their two PNG assets and ultimately enable Greg to create shareholder value in a variety of ways. GoGold Resources: 2024 Performance -24%, IRR 30% GoGold has been waiting two years for its permit in Mexico. The delay was caused by the previous Mexican President Andres Manual Lopez Obrador’s (AMLO) staunch opposition to new mining development. In the end, while neither of AMLO’s major proposed changes to the mining code passed, few mining permits of any kind were issued during his time in office. GoGold’s large cash buffer and existing heap leach operation enabled the company to wait out AMLO without needing to raise additional equity capital. We think their patience will soon be rewarded as the new administration of President Claudia Sheinbaum plans to process permit applications on their technical merits. In GoGold’s case, the technical merits of their Los Ricos South project are exceptionally strong with over 100 million oz of silver at an average grade of 276 g/t. Sincerely, Equinox Partners Investment Management
By Kieran Brennan January 17, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. declined -6.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024, finishing the calendar year 2024 up +17.7% net of all fees. Our poor performance in the fourth quarter was driven by a sharp selloff in gold and silver miners despite a flat gold price during the period. 2024 Year in Review Crew Energy accounted for 100% of our fund’s performance in 2024. We offered a fulsome write-up of Crew in our third quarter letter and need not repeat the details of the acquisition by Tourmaline here, other than to note that the 72% premium resulted in an ~18% contribution to the fund’s total return. While there was significant movement among our other investments, their aggregate contribution was close to zero. This is a disappointing result given the significant progress many of our companies made last year. The market was not impressed by Paramount Resources’ sale of its core asset to Ovintiv for $3.3bn CAD. Nor did the market seem to care that Kosmos energy finally brought its flagship Tortue asset online in December. Thesis Gold’s positive feasibility study elicited an initial positive reaction, which was quickly reversed. Elsewhere, the market remains totally indifferent to the rapid progress that West African Resources is making at their Kiaka asset. While we understand that our sectors are out of favor, we would hope to see at least some of the value they are creating reflected in their stock prices in 2025. We’ve been busy over the past six months, establishing several sizable, new positions. We sold half of the Tourmaline shares we received in consideration for our Crew shares and used funds to make the following investments: an 11% portfolio weight in Solidcore Resources, an 8% position in Kosmos Energy, a 5% weighting in Ensign Energy, and a 5% weight in Gran Tierra Energy. Solidcore and Kosmos are both top five positions and receive a full writeup in the letter that follows. Ensign Energy is a North American energy service company, and Gran Tierra Energy is an E&P company with assets in Latin America and Canada. Both Ensign and Gran Tierra trade at particularly compelling valuations. investment Thesis Review for our top 5 Long Positions by Weight
By Kieran Brennan January 17, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. appreciated +6.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and finished the year up +11.1%. Performance for the quarter was driven primarily by the positive performance our operating company holdings in Nigeria, Ghana, and Georgia. A breakdown of Kuroto Fund exposures can be found here . 2024 Year in Review Kuroto’s top five investments made large strides last year. Seplat completed its ExxonMobil Nigeria acquisition, more than doubling its production, cash flow and reserves. Georgia Capital successfully sold a non-core asset and is in a good position to buy back a lot of stock this year. MTN Ghana saw strong operational performance while Ghana’s economy and currency stabilized. Guaranty Trust Bank completed a government-mandated equity raise, and Nigeria made steps towards stabilizing its economy. Lastly, Kosmos brought on its long-delayed Tortue LNG project. In each case, we believe the market has not adequately factored in the progress our companies have made, and we anticipate a more fulsome rerating of our top holdings in 2025.
By Kieran Brennan November 1, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. rose +3.1% in the third quarter and is up +11.0% through the end of September 2024. Performance for the quarter was driven primarily by our group of explorers, with additional positive contribution coming from the producing segment of the portfolio. These gains were partially offset by the decline of one of our development stage companies which has experienced delays and raised additional capital. As our gold miners have lagged the indices, a substantial valuation gap has opened between the largest gold miners in the industry and the producing companies we own. At spot pricing, consensus sell-side models have Agnico, Barrick, Kinross and Newmont delivering an IRR of just 3%. Our portfolio of producers, on the other hand, models out to an IRR of 20% using the same metals price assumptions. There's substantial value in the gold mining sector, but the largest companies are not the ones to own.
By Kieran Brennan October 31, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. declined -0.8% in the third quarter of 2024 and is up +4.2% for the year through September 30 th . Performance for the quarter was driven by a pullback in our energy holdings, which more than offset the gains in MTN Ghana and several of our financials. A breakdown of Kuroto Fund exposures can be found here . Kuroto Fund's Energy Investments Since SUmmer of 2020 Kuroto Fund began adding oil producers to the portfolio in August 2020. Today, we own four oil companies. Cumulatively, our portfolio of oil companies have added $5mn to our P&L, but more than all of this performance has come from one company, Seplat. By our calculation Seplat will be generating a free cash flow yield of ~28% once it consummates the acquisition of Exxon Mobil Nigeria early next year. While our remaining portfolio of oil companies, in aggregate, have yet to contribute positively to our returns, they are executing and delivering strong fundamental progress. One of these portfolio companies we expect will complete an acquisition this month that should increase production by 60%. Two others should bring on long-delayed fields before year-end and we expect all three to release meaningful exploration results over the next six months. 
By Kieran Brennan October 31, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. rose +16.4% in the third quarter of 2024 and is up +25.9% for the year through September 30th. The positive performance for the quarter was driven by the revaluation of our largest position, Crew Energy, which was up +70% in the quarter on the news it would be acquired by Tourmaline Oil. A breakdown of Equinox Partners exposures can be found here . Crew Energy Investment Post-Mortem On October 1st, Tourmaline Oil acquired Crew Energy bringing a decade-long Equinox Partners’ investment to a successful conclusion. Crew transacted for $1.15 billion USD, which included $960MM USD in Tourmaline shares and $190MM USD of assumed debt. The 72% premium Tourmaline paid resulted in an 11.6% IRR on our investment. This IRR, however, understates the positive impact Crew has had on our performance in recent years. Since we upsized our investment in Crew in the spring of 2020, Crew has been the most significant driver of our fund’s returns. Over the entire life of the investment, Crew contributed a cumulative +139% to our fund’s performance. Accordingly, we felt an investment review is in order. Attracted by Crew Energy’s low-cost and long-lived natural gas reserves in British Columbia, we first invested in December of 2014. At the time of our initial purchase, the Canadian natural gas strip averaged CAD $3.75. If strip prices held, Crew would be able to grow its production at 20%+ per year for a decade with internally generated cash flow. While our thesis about the quality of Crew’s assets was accurate, our assumptions about natural gas prices in North America proved too optimistic. The North American natural benchmark, Henry Hub, averaged just USD $3.09 over the past decade, and the Western Canada benchmark, AECO, fared even worse averaging CAD $2.59. 
By Kieran Brennan July 24, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. rose +2.1% in the second quarter, and is up +7.7% for the 2024 year-to-date through the end of June. Our portfolio of producing gold companies have been the primary drivers of contribution to return, while the early stage explorers and developers have traded down despite the rising metals price. A breakdown of Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund's exposures can be found here . Gold Miners vs. Gold
By Kieran Brennan July 24, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. rose +5.7% in the second quarter of 2024. The positive performance for the quarter was primarily driven by our mining positions, with additional positive contribution from our energy companies. A breakdown of Equinox Partners exposures can be found here . Gold Miners vs. Gold 
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